Long-Term Cross-Party Commitment
Regional recovery requires a multi-decade moral compact that no single government can deliver or cancel.
The Long-Term Cross-Party Commitment framework is Collier's synthesis of what the East German reunification programme did right that the UK Levelling Up programme failed to do. The core argument is that regional recovery — moving a post-industrial region from collapse to competitive productivity — takes a generation (30 years), which spans multiple electoral cycles and multiple governments. Any programme that depends on the commitment of a single party or a single government will be underfunded, reversed, or politicised into uselessness.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's approach to East German reunification is Collier's primary case study. Kohl made three moves at the outset that UK governments have never replicated: he framed the commitment as a moral duty (not just a policy choice), he secured cross-party endorsement before spending a penny, and he raised taxes explicitly to fund it — naming the tax the 'solidarity tax' to make the moral argument visible in the price signal. The spending was €70B/year for 30 years, channelled through a dedicated institution (KfW) with 7,000 staff, devolved to city level.
The UK contrast is vivid. Levelling Up was announced as Boris Johnson's 'flagship programme' — party political framing from the first word. No cross-party compact was sought. No new tax was proposed. The budget was £4B over four years, 90% of which was vetoed by the Treasury. East German productivity went from 20% to 85% of West German. South Yorkshire's productivity relative to London has moved in the wrong direction over the same period.
- Regional recovery takes 30 years — any programme designed for a 5-year political cycle will not work.
- Cross-party endorsement before spending begins is what makes recovery durable — it removes the electoral weapon that makes opponents defund programmes when they gain power.
- The moral framing must name who has been lucky and who has been unlucky — solidarity requires acknowledging that luck, not merit, explains the gap.
- Revenue must be raised explicitly and honestly — pretending a recovery programme can be funded without tax increases is a lie that guarantees underfunding.
- If you never start, recovery takes eternity — the correct response to 'this will take 30 years' is to start immediately.
- Establish the moral framing before the fiscal caseKohl led with moral duty, not economic efficiency. He told West Germans they had been lucky to be on the western side of an arbitrary military line — not more talented, not more hard-working, just luckier. The same framing applies to London versus the north of England.Pro tipThe moral argument makes the fiscal ask more durable — people pay solidarity taxes when they believe the beneficiary deserves solidarity, not just when they calculate a return.WarningEfficiency arguments alone ('investment in the north will grow GDP') are insufficient — they invite short-termism because the return is distant and speculative.
- Secure cross-party commitment before announcing spendingKohl got all German political parties to endorse reunification funding before any programme was designed. This removed the programme from partisan competition — it could no longer be used as an electoral weapon by the opposition.WarningAnnouncing a programme as 'flagship' policy of your party is the opposite of this — it guarantees the opposition will defund it when they gain power.
- Raise the revenue honestly and name itKohl introduced the Solidaritätszuschlag (solidarity surcharge) explicitly named as a tax to fund reunification. The naming did two things: it made the moral argument visible in the tax bill, and it prevented future governments from quietly redirecting the revenue.Pro tipIn the UK context, Collier suggests closing existing tax loopholes on capital gains, inheritance, and council tax valuation before raising headline rates — generating the first 5 years of funding without needing a political battle over income tax.
- Commit to a 30-year horizon explicitlyKohl said publicly at the outset: this will take a generation, I will not be in power when it completes, and my party may not be either. That honesty was what made cross-party endorsement possible — no one party was claiming credit for the outcome.Pro tipUse intermediate milestones (5-year productivity benchmarks, measured against peer regions) to sustain public support across the 30-year horizon.
- Create a dedicated institution, devolved to city levelKfW, Germany's reconstruction bank, had 7,000 staff and channelled funds to city-level authorities who could adapt spending to local conditions. The institution was not a Treasury department — it had operational independence and a devolved mandate.Pro tipModel the UK equivalent on the city-region mayor network already in place — give the mayors the institution rather than creating a new Whitehall body.WarningDo not run the programme through the Treasury — the Treasury's veto culture is the primary mechanism of underfunding.
Kohl launched reunification in 1992 with cross-party endorsement, an explicit solidarity tax, a 30-year horizon, and €70B/year channelled through KfW to city-level authorities. He acknowledged publicly that West Germans were lucky, not superior, and that their moral duty followed from that luck.
Boris Johnson announced Levelling Up as his flagship party political programme. No cross-party compact. No new tax. Budget of £4B over four years (vs East Germany's €70B/year). 90% vetoed by Treasury. Michael Gove, as minister, declined to resign or publicly protest the programme's hollowness.
In the 1950s, the UK demonstrated cross-party consensus through 'Butskellism' — the convergence of Butler (Conservative) and Gaitskell (Labour) on economic policy. This showed that British politics can operate with a shared programme rather than adversarial cancellation.
Collier arrived at this framework through comparing what worked (East Germany, the Basque recovery) with what failed (UK Levelling Up, managed decline of Liverpool and Sheffield). The common factor in success cases was time horizon, funding seriousness, moral framing, and cross-party durability. He traces the UK's capacity for this — the 1950s 'Butskellism' era shows cross-party consensus was once possible in Britain — and argues it must be recovered rather than invented.